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PREFACE
Before going to our specific points in support of rehearing, we ask the Court's indulgence in a few prefatory
remarks which may prove to be of some help.
If there is any precept which is founded deeply in
the roots of our system of justice, it is that each person,
including a corporation, is entitled to have a day in Court.
In litigation under Utah procedure, this entitlement
s1iould consist of a just and equitable hearing before the
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State Tax Commission and a full consideration of all issues on appeal. In the present case, Kennecott has been
short-changed on each. True, there was a scheduled hearing before the Tax Commission, but the one accorded
plaintiffs cannot be viewed with an honest conviction
that the issues were decided by the Commissioners with
open minds. For too long plaintiffs have been the subjects
of special adverse tax treatment by the Commission because as a group they appear to be a source of additional
revenue when funds are short. Certainly, a fair inference
from this record is that the decision to uphold the deficiency against Kennecott was made long before the
hearing. We, of course, understand that the Commission
is charged with the collection of taxes. Moreover, under
Utah law, the Commission controls all proceedings, and
is advised by its auditor and legal counsel. In a very
real sense, the Commission is both the "prosecutor" and
the "judge" in a case of this type - an enviable combination. Certainly, this record bespeaks of unequal application of the law for when the early pleadings were filed
in the case, the Commission publicly announced, before
the facts had ever been presented, that the Supreme
Court would make the decision, thus indicating the die
had been cast and there was no possibility that the Tax
Commission would rule in Kennecott's favor. 1
In view of these considerations, we respectfully submit that any presumption in favor of this administrative
isee Affidavit attached to Petitioner's Motion for Disqualification of Commissioners. Tr. 23-25.
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body's dec1s1on should be accorded little, if any, real
deference.
In view of this background, the hearing and proceedings before the Tax Commission were undertaken not as
'
an end in themselves, but as a necessary step for our day
in this Court. The case was presented to the Tax Commission by a full and detailed development of all of the
Company's operations, an explanation of the tax returns,
with the supporting testimony of two outstanding leaders
and experts in the field of taxation whose opinions were
not questioned, but ignored. The point we wish to make
is that the extensive evidence was not introduced with
any real hope that the Tax Commission would deny its
public utterances but in the conviction that the Supreme
Court of the State would fully consider all issues on their
merits and render an opinion which would not merely
mention a few issues and then sweepingly announce on
these that the Tax Commission is 100% correct and plaintiffs wholly wrong.

A decision of this Court should serve two functions
- the resolution of the instant controversy and, equally
or more important to the parties and all multi-state taxpayers generally, the promulgation of guiding precedents
that will serve as an aid in future disputes. Although recognizing the complexities of this case, we suggest to the
Court that the majority opinion fails of its purpose in
both respects. First, the majority opinion is 'so barren in
explanation of the issues and reasons for reaching the
dtiriate results as to leave a vacuum of frustration and
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a serious question as to whether the parties have really
had their day in Court. Second, as a guide for resolving
future disputes between either these parties or others,
the decision is of no assistance. About all that can be
concluded with any certainty is that insofar as Kennecott
is concerned, the Tax Commission now has been granted
a carte blanche to do as it pleases - with the sky as the
only limit - a postulate which neither this nor any other
taxpayer should be required to accept.
Perhaps it is appropos at this point to quote the
language of Mr. Justice Henriod in Budget Homes, Inc.
v. State Tax Commission, 2 where he expresses a conceptional truism which counsel believes should be given consideration by the Judges concurring in the majority opinion:
"The record reflects no improper motive. It may
reflect the employment of a legally sanctioned ingenuity conceived in order to effectuate a tax saving - but such employment is a prerogative reserved unto the already overburdened taxpayer
since the Isham case. Taking advantage of a
legitimate course of conduct to effect tax savings
may result in collection of fewer taxes by the tax
collector, but it nevertheless has judicial sanction.
Great caution, therefore, should be exercised lest
an honest taxpayer be required to indulge in the
expensive necessity of absolving himself from suspicion. Administrative procedure is here to stay,
but so is the presumption that taxpayers generally
pay a full and honest tax, and a lawful plan designed to save tax burdens, if genuine, must not
2120 Utah 425, 235 P. 2d 501 (1951).
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be interpreted administratively to be a stratagem
for evasion. Constitutionally guaranteed proprietary rights must be preserved not only against
judicial error, but also against administrative fiat
- in cases even like this, where, we are satisfied,
the Commission arrived at its conclusion honestly
and after careful review, albeit in error." 3
Significantly in the instant case, the plaintiffs followed the law in effect at the time they prepared and
filed their return. That fact is not disputed. While the
statute created a situation where by following its terms
the plaintiffs may have realized some savings in their
Utah State franchise taxes, for plaintiffs to legally reduce
their tax burden is not tax evasion. Yet, the sole reason
leading the Commission to discard the statutory formula
is that, by using its elastic yardstick, it will extract more
tax money from Kennecott. With these comments as a
prelude to our contentions in this proceeding, we move
on to discuss the points we wish to raise and argue:

POINT I.
THE COURT FAILED TO DECIDE THE
ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE TAX COMM I S SI 0 N ERRED IN DENYING THE
PLAINTIFFS THE RIGHT TO FILE A CONSOLIDATED RETURN.
The consolidated return issue was the first and one
of the most significant issues presented by plaintiffs in
their Writ of Review and arguments, yet we find no reso"120 Utah at 429.
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lution of the issue in the decision. The decision neither
answers this point nor provides any guidelines which
would be helpful to the plaintiffs in filing future returns.
This point was properly raised by the plaintiffs, extensively argued by the parties in their briefs and orally,
but treated sub silentio by the Court in its decision. It
is worth emphasizing that the issue is separate and distinct from the allocation question, which at least was
accorded some treatment in the Court's decision. There
is no reason whatsoever to assume that since the allocation issue was resolved adversely to Kennecott, that
holding is dispositive of the consolidation issue.
As a starting point, we refer the Court to Point I of
plaintiffs' briefs (both the initial and the reply) and to
Point V of the Tax Commission's brief. The arguments
presented therein dealt exclusively with the consolidated
return issue. The issue raised was quite simple - which
party has properly followed the statute and regulation
pertaining to the computations of a consolidated return?
It was by happenstance that this issue came before the
Court at the same time the allocation question was presented. This coincidence arises from the fact that for the
first time in 1967, Kennecott filed under the Unifonn
Act (which raised the allocation problem brought up by
the Tax Commission), and simultaneously for the first
time in 1967, Kennecott filed a consolidated tax return,
together with its affiliated companies doing business in
Utah. The Commission's response to this raised the consolidated return question. Even at the sake of being

.,
repetitious, we stress again, that in no way is the consolidation issue resolved by the majority's disposition of
the allocation point.
To clarify our views with respect to the basic distinction between allocation issues and consolidated return issues, it shculd be noted that Utah's consolidated
return statute is an integral part of the substantive tax
law of Utah. The consolidated return provision was
adopted in 1931 along with other substantive provisions
which define income, define deductions, and otherwise
aid in determining what taxable income is. These substantive provisions apply equally to all corporate taxpayers whether they are multi-state companies or not. The
Uniform Act was never intended to alter these substantive
provisions,• but was merely adopted for the purpose of
allocating or apportioning the taxable income of a multistate taxpayer once it was determined, according to the
substantive law, what the taxable income is.
A majority of the Court has concluded that for the
years in question, as an allocation proposition, the returns of taxpayer did not fairly reflect its business activity in the State of Utah. Therefore, the majority has
authorized the Tax Commission to deviate from the Uniform formula and substitute a different method of allocation. Again, at the sake of being repetitious, we reassert that this holding does not reach the consolidation
question, nor does it in any way answer this specific ques•Pierce, The Uniform Divi.sion of Income for State Tax Purposes,
33 TAXES 747 (1957).
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tion posed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, that issue, notwithstanding the fact that it was argued and submitted
to the Court, is still open and unanswered.
As we have discussed in our previous briefs, and will
mention only briefly again, plaintiffs followed the clear
letter and intent of the Utah statutes and the Tax Commission's regulations, and filed a consolidated tax return.
In doing so, taxpayer computed a figure known as "consolidated net income". This computation was made in
accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-23,
which grants qualified taxpayers the right to file such
a return, and Regulation No. 4 (12) promulgated by the
Tax Commission and effective for the years 1967 and
1968.
This regulation provides:
"Consolidated net income shall be the aggregate
of the gross income of each of the includable corporations less the aggregate of the allowable deductions of ... such corporations...."•
Following the language strictly, plaintiffs added up the
gross incomes of Kennecott Copper Corporation (parent
corporation), Peabody, Chase, Bear Creek, and the other
subsidiaries, and subtracted therefrom the aggregate of
the deductions of all of those entities, resulting in a figure which the regulations require and define as "consolidated net income."
Although conceding that taxpayer meets the statutory qualifications for consolidation, the Tax Commission
5Tr. 554 at page 52.

9
took a completely different approach which we contend
it contrary to law and which our experts testified was in
violation of its own Regulation No. 4(12). The Tax Commission, in its deficiency notice, did not compute consolidated net income, but, rather, computed separate corporate income for each of the consolidated corporations. In so
doing, it ignored its own Regulation No. 4(12) and the
Court by silence appears to have placed its stamp of approval on the state agency's own transgression of its regulations. This seems rather inconsistent, for a majority
of the Judges (in this same opinion) have announced the
proposition that as to federal income tax allocation, Kennecott was bound to follow the regulations of the Tax
Commission. We see no reason why the same or a greater
duty is not saddled on the Tax Commission which, as an
administrative agency, should be required to follow its
own regulations as they pertain to consolidation. 6 If that
is done, no matter what the Court eventually decides on
the question of allocation, the consolidation issue must
be resolved in favor of plaintiffs and they must be permitted to file their consolidated returns as allowed by
Regulation No. 4 (12). If the Tax Commission is reversed
on this point and sustained in connection with allocation,
this will only permit the plaintiffs to do what the statute
states they may do - consolidate all income of all plaintiff corporations, which income could then be apportioned
sFor cases which hold that administrative agencies are bound to
follow their own existing regulations, see, e.g., Gibbons v. Arizona
Corporation Commission, 95 Ariz. 343, 390 P. 2d 582 (1964), and
State ex rel. Independent School Dist. No. 6 v. Johnson, 242 Minn.
5.39, 65 N. W. 2d 668 (1954).
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in a manner consistent with the Court's decision on allocation.
In short, all we ask is a ruling by this Court that the
Tax Commission, when dealing with an interstate taxpayer, must follow the provisions of its own Regulation
No. 4 (12). Its only justification for refusing to do so is
that the consolidated return provisions do not apply to
an interstate taxpayer.' That explanation is patently untenable under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, which certainly forbids any such discrimina·
tion against an interstate company, and is also clearly
refuted by prior decisions of this Court. 8

If the taxpayer saves money by filing a consolidated
return, that is its right under the law. 0 It has been recently held in a federal tax case (the consolidated return
statute being the prototype of Utah's) that there need
be no "business purpose" for consolidation and that:
"The setting off of real losses which have accrued
both in the economic and tax sense after an affiliation is apparently precisely what Congress in•The Tax Commission so concluded in its Decision. Conclusion
of Law No. 8 in that Decision states:
"The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act contemplates apportionment by a single taxpayer and not a group of
taxpayers. Apportionment must occur separately for each taxpayer or else the Act would have allowed group aggregation or
spoken of taxpayers in a plural sense." (Tr. 687.)

BBennett Association v. State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108,
426 P. 2d 812 (1967), and J. M. & M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 (1945).
9Budget Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 120 Utah 425.
235 P. 2d 501 (1951).
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tended to permit by the consolidated return sections of the Code. Such setoffs do not distort
but rather reflect the true liability of a
In light of the above arguments, and those in our
briefs, we conclude by requesting that the Court rule on
this issue in favor of the taxpayer.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE MATTER OF
ALLOCATION.
In sustaining the Tax Commission's departure from
the Uniform allocation formula, the majority of the Court
has grossly misstated Kennecott's position, has relied upon facts which are incorrect, has relied upon comparisons
which are not valid, and has cited precedents which not
only do not support, but completely refute, the Court's
conclusion.

Kennecott's Position
The majority states:

"It is Kennecott's contention that the Legislature
having adopted a formula for apportionment of
business income to the State, the Tax Commission
was not authorized to depart from that formula
and to make its own allocation."
If that were Kennecott's position, which it is not,
the Court would have been correct in denouncing it for
no one could successfully argue such a proposition in view
10Hall Paving Company v. United States, 28 AFTR 2d, Para.
71-5299, (N. D. Ga. Oct. 28, 1971).
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of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-95 (the "Relief
Provision"). We agree that the Tax Commission has
the power to deviate from the formula, but have urged
before and urge again that before doing so, it must meet
the burden of proof specified by this Court in Wes tern
Contracting: 11
"We hold that, if the operations of a multi-state
corporation be unitary in character, the proportion
of net income to be allocated to this state must
be determined by the statutory formula (subsection (6)) unless the party opposing the application
of such formula shall prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxes so imposed are grossly
disproportionate to the business conducted in this
state or subjects the taxpayer to double taxation.

*

*

*

Unless this is made to appear by clear and cogent
evidence the formula should be applied." 12 (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion summarily concludes in this
respect that:
"The record supports the Commission's conclusion that the use of the formula did not fairly represent the extent of Kennecott's business activity
in this State during the years 1967 and 1968."
May we ask, not rhetorically but sincerely, wherein does
the record support that conclusion? Wherein is Chief
Justice Callister, supported by Judge Erickson, wrong in
observing that:
11Western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
121s Utah 2d at 31 and 36.
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"The presumption of the fairness of the formula
has not been rebutted by clear and cogent evidence directed at each element of the equation."
All that the majority has mentioned to support its crucial
decision are three items: (1) the fact that, as compared
with 1966, Kennecott's returns for 1967 and 1968 reflect
lower taxes paid to Utah, (2) reference to the sales factor in the formula, and (3) the comparison of allocated
income with depletion figures. We believe it is possible
that the majority, in relying upon these considerations,
overlooked certain additional matters of great significance.
1.

The Comparison With Prior Years.

Reading the Court's decision, one cannot escape the
conclusion that the Court was greatly influenced by the
fact that in 1967 and 1968 the income reported by Kennecott for taxation in Utah was less than that reported
in 1966. On page 2, the Court observes:
"The use of the formula resulted in a sharp decline in the franchise taxes due the State of Utah
for those years [1967 and 1968]."
Again, at page 3, the Court observes:
"The use of this factor [referring to the sales factor] tended to greatly diminish the amount of the
franchise taxes due under the returns filed by
Kennecott for the years 1967 and 1968. . .."

In the majority opinion, this fact is emphasized twice and
hence we must assume it played some significant role in
t11".' Court's decision.
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The Court, in this reliance, is mistaken as to certain
most significant factors. Firstly, it is a gross mistake to
assume that the decline for 1967 and 1968 was attributable to the use of the Uniform Act. There were other factors which contributed significantly:
(a) As the Court will no doubt recall, 1967 and
1968 were strike years during which Kennecott's entire
copper operations were shut down from July 1, 1967
through March 31, 1968. No one could deny that the
strike and its aftermath had a catastrophic effect on taxable income as compared with 1966, which was a full operation year. Not just its Utah operations, but the entire
corporation suffered. Kennecott's pre-tax earnings in
1966 were $8.00 per share, but in 1967 were only $3.64 per
share. In 1968 they were $4.50 per share. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that 1967 and 1968 resulted in
lower income allocated to Utah than for 1966.
1

'

(b) For the first time in 1967 and 1968, Kennecott
and its subsidiaries filed consolidated tax returns in Utah.
This, aside from all considerations of allocation, had the
effect of reducing income allocated to Utah for the two
years in question because of the less profitable operation
of some of the subsidiaries such as Chase Brass and Peabody. In future years, however, it may well be that Utah
will profit, tax-wise, from the consolidation. In all events,
as noted in the Hall Paving case, supra, "Such setoffs do
1sThese figures were computed without accounting for extraordinary items and were taken from Kennecott's annual reports to
stockholders for 1966, 1967 and 1968. See Tr. 653, 654 and 655.
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not distort, but rather reflect the true liability of a taxpayer."
So it may be seen that in no way can the decrease
in tax revenues be solely pinned on the Uniform Act.
Other factors, completely unrelated to allocation, contributed significantly.
It should also be stressed that 1966 taxes or taxable
income arc by no means a valid benchmark for comparison with later years. As the majority opinion correctly
observes, 1966 taxes were computed on the basis of a
special agreement between Kennecott and the Tax Commission. This agreement was entered into by litigationweary parties in 1962. Under this agreement, Kennecott
filed its returns in a completely "nonstatutory" form
which greatly increased Utah's income. For example, the
Utah property factor was doubled and all gold and silver
sales were allocated to Utah. 14 This agreement was not
binding, perpetually, on either party. The Tax Commission has not based its deficiency on this agreement, and
in no way does the agreement reflect what Kennecott's
proper tax liability would have been in 1966 under the
then existing allocation statute. The Tax Commission
stipulated below that the 1966 returns were in no way
binding upon Kennecott.
"MR. HOWARD: And it is also my position that
the purpose of clarifying the record that the 1966
return in no way binds the taxpayer to continue
filing as it filed in 1966, or reporting income in
14

Tr. 295.
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the same way that it reported it in 1966. I don't
think there is any binding effect on the '66 agreement at all." (Tr. 304) (Emphasis added.)
J:'hus, for this Court t.o use that return as a comparison
is t.o perpetuate obvious inequities.
Bearing in mind both that the Uniform Act was not
significantly responsible for the decline from 1966, and
that 1966 is in no way a criterion year, how can the comparison be relevant t.o the basic issue before the Court,
viz., does the formula reasonably reflect business activity
in Utah in 1967 and 1968? We simply do not see how
1966 figures, under a different law, different facts, and
all of the circumstances, could have even the slightest
probative force on that issue.
2.

Sales Factor.

The sales factor must be viewed as the sine qua rwn
of this case so far as the issue of allocation is concerned.
As the majority opinion correctly observed, it was this
fact.or "which resulted in the Commission's modification
of the formula under the relief provisions of Section 5913-95". The fact.or also is discussed prominently in both
the majority and dissenting opinions of the decision, and
this fact.or is blamed for the reduction in taxes from prior
years. The Court notes in this respect:
"The use of this factor [sales) tended t.o greatly
diminish the amount of the franchise taxes due
under the return filed by Kennecott for the years
1967 and 1968...."
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This substantial reliance upon the sales factor is
unjustified. Moreover, even if the sales factor is distorted, as the Court clearly infers, such distortion would
not justify the vast amount of money claimed in the deficiency assessment.
We shall reiterate, only briefly, the reasons why the
sales factor, itself, does not provide sufficient justification
for deviation from the formula.
The three-factor formula, as contained in the Uniform Act adopted in Utah, is designed to properly reflect
various aspects of a taxpayer's business activity. In the
case of a producing company, such as Kennecott, the payroll and property factors operate to assign 66% of the
weight to the place of production or manufacture. The
sales factor counterbalances this by according 33% of
the weight to the marketplace. The sound theory behind
this formula is that the marketing of a product is important to the overall production of income and must be accorded significance for tax purposes. To do otherwise
would be to weight the formula too heavily in favor of
production states to the detriment of market states. If
one were to eliminate the sales factor, the result would
be to give the production states 100% of the weight in
the formula and the market states 0% of the weight.
Since this would result in a substantial distortion of the
realities of how income is earned by an interstate taxpayer, virtually every state which has taxation based
upon the income of interstate taxpayers utilizes a sales

18

or receipts factor in its formula.'" It is for this reason
that it is wholly improper to take the sales factor and
accord to it such great significance as is accorded by the
majority opinion.
The courts have long held that in order to successfully attack the formula one must show inequities or distortions in all three factors, not simply one. The timetested presumption is that if only one factor is distorted,
any such distortion will be counterbalanced and outweighted by the reliability of the other two factors. These
are not strange words to this Court since it embraced
this very principle under identical circumstances in the
Western Contracting'" case. There, too, the Tax Commission argued that the formula was inappropriate in
view of the fact that sales were allocated outside of the
State of Utah. This Court, relying upon a long line of
precedent, clearly and distinctly rejected that argument
by stating:
"In the instant case, the Tax Commission further
contends that an application of the statutory
formula is inequitable because, in the gross receipts' factor, none of the plaintiff's sales are ap
portionable to Utah.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the
California Packing case, observed that the purpose
of the three-factor formula was to provide a rough
15 At last count, 43 of the 45 states which impose some sort of
income taxes on interstate corporations use sales or receipts as a
factor in their apportionment formulas. See Prentice-Hall State and
Local Taxes - All States Tax Guide, Para. 223 (Nov. 1971).

1s1s Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
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but equitable method of making a proper allocation,_ and if one factor tended to allocate a disproportionate amount of net income, the other factors
tended to compensate for this matter.
In Butler Bros. v. McColgan, the California Supreme Court elaborated on this issue and stated
that to rebut the presumption of fairness of the
formula, there must be clear and cogent evidence
directed to each element of the equation to prove
that the assumed relation among the various factors produced an erroneous result." 11 (Emphasis
added.)

We are completely unable to comprehend why this
line of reasoning, applied by the Court in Western Contracting, is now rejected by the Court in the instant case.
The only discernible difference between Western Contracting and the taxpayer in this case is the matter of
size. In the State of Utah, we now have two sets of rules:
Under Western Contracting, it is clear that small taxpayers are entitled to use the formula and that mere alleged
distortions in the sales factor are inadequate to allow
deviation from the formula. In the case of larger taxpayers, such as Kennecott, such rules do not apply and the
Tax Commission is free to deviate from the three-factor
formula on the basis of alleged distortions in the sales
factor alone. We need not remind the Court that under
our system of government and under any reasonable construction of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such discrimination cannot be allowed to stand.
171g Utah 2d at 34.

20
But let us go one step further and test, by calculation, the reasonableness of the Court's decision. Let us
assume, as we do only arguendo, that the sales factor indeed causes some actionable distortion in the formula. Let
us further assume, as to which the record is quite clear,
that there is no distortion seriously claimed or proved
with respect to either of the other two factors, payroll
and property. Conceding, arguendo, that this would allow
the Tax Commission to deviate from the formula, we
think it is nonetheless obvious that any such deviation
must be relevant to and proportionate to the claimed distortion of the formula. Not only is this required as a
matter of statute (the relief provision itself requires that
any deviation must be both "reasonable" and "equitable"), but it is also obvious from a standpoint of common
sense. If a doctor has a patient with a malignancy on his
arm, it is not reasonable to cure that by cutting off his
head and his leg. Rather, the remedy must be directed
to the illness. The same is true in the case of the formula.
If, indeed, there is a distortion in the sales factor, the
remedy must be directed to the sales or it must at least
be commensurate with the claimed distortion. It is in
this respect that the deficiency assessment and the Tax
Commission's decision completely failed to be reasonable
and equitable. The Tax Commission has not limited its
deviation to the sales factor, but has completely reshuffled and rejuggled the entire corporation, and has come
up with a hybrid version of separate accounting to handle
the problem, which results in distortions far greater than
those which existed, as claimed, in the sales factor.
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Let us, for example, look at what could be done to
remedy the sales factor, if in fact it is distorted. One
thing that could be done is to simply eliminate the sales
factor and not use it at all. This approach is justified by
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-95 (b) , which provides that if the formula does not fairly reflect the extent
of the taxpayer's business activity, the Commission may

COMPARATIVE RESULTS TO
DEMONSTRATE EFFECT OF THE SALES FACTOR
1967

1. Income Allocated to Utah by
Taxpayer for 1967 __________________________ $ 4,645,102

100%

2. Income which would be
Allocated to Utah if the sales
factor were excluded completely __ $ 8,519,000*

163%

3. Income which would be
Allocated to Utah if the Utah
Copper Division sales were
Allocated to Utah __________________________ $ 8,328,107* * 179%
4. Income which was in fact
Allocated to Utah by the Commission and approved by the
Court ------------------------------------------------$18,585,435

400%

*This computation was made by taking total apportionable income per the return of $16,644,996 adjusted for depletion per the
Court's decision to $19,966,693 multiplied by 42.63 which is the average of the payroll and property factors of 42.883 and 42.483 respectively. These figures are not adjusted for Federal income
"*This computation was made by taking adjusted apportionable
income of $19,966,693 multiplied by the average of property, payroll
and Utah Copper Division sales which sales were some 353 of the
taxpayer's total sales. These figures are not adjusted for Federal income tax.
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exclude "any one or more of the factors". Another thing
that might be done is to take the sales from the Utah
Copper Division, which taxpayer has allocated outside
of the State of Utah, and reallocate those sales to the
State of Utah. Fortunately, the necessary figures are all
in the record for purposes of making these computations,
and therefore we set forth in the foregoing chart the comparative results of amending the sales factor in one of
the two methods proposed. These results are compared
with the income actually allocated by the taxpayer for
1967 and the income actually allocated by the Tax Commission for 1967.
The chart demonstrates some very interesting things.
First, it demonstrates that when you compare the taxpayer's allocated income with the amount allocated by
the Tax Commission (as approved by the majority of
this Court), you will see that the Tax Commission has
apportioned four times as much income to Utah as has
the taxpayer. More importantly, however, it illustrates
that the Tax Commission has allocated far more income
to Utah than would be justified by even the most extreme
measures in connection with the sales factor. Computation No. 2 on the chart demonstrates that if the sales
factor were excluded completely, and the two-factor formula consisting of property and payroll were utilized, it
would approximately double the amount of income allocated by Kennecott. This would be the most favorable
possible construction and deviation to remedy the alleged
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distortion found by the Tax Commission. Please note,
however, that the Tax Commission has gone much further
than this ultimate and has allocated over $10 million
additional income to the State of Utah than might be
justified even by the extreme measure suggested in Computation No. 2. In Computation No. 3, the Utah Copper
Division sales have been allocated to Utah, thus increasing the Utah sales factor for 1967 from .831 % to some
39.77%. When this is averaged with the property and payroll factors, it results in a tax equal to 179% of that reported on the taxpayer's return. The point we are trying
to make and illustrate by the foregoing chart is that even
if the Court is correct that the sales factor is distorted
somehow, the remedy applied by the Tax Commission is
completely disproportionate to the claimed distortion. We
go back to our analogy of the malignant arm. The Tax
Commission has gone much farther than excising the
claimed malignancy; it has, in fact, "overkilled" to the
tune of some $10 million.
There can be no question but that this Court has the
power to require the State Tax Commission, in deviating
from the formula, to do so in a reasonable and equitable
fashion, and in some way that is reasonably related to
the claimed distortion in the formula. We are not dealing
with a situation, contrary to the majority opinion's approach, which presupposes that the result must be either
black or white - that is, that either the taxpayer is entirely wrong or the Tax Commission is entirely wrong.
It may well be, although we do not concede it, that the
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sales factor does create some actionable distortion in the
formula. However, the mere fact that the majority has
found justification for deviating from the formula in no
way suggests that the Tax Commission is, therefote, free
to impose just any substitute method which strikes its
fancy. Under the most extreme remedy imaginable, the
Commission should be allowed to throw out the sales
factor, thereby almost doubling the reported tax. This
is extreme in and of itself since it is tantamount to saying
that the marketplace should receive no weight in allocating income and that 100% of the weight should be accorded to place of production. Please note, however, that
this extreme (although almost doubling the tax) is still
far short of the Tax Commission's alternative method.
We, therefore, respectully submit that, even if deviation from the formula is justified, such deviation must
be confined to some method of attack which is both "reasonable" and "equitable" as measured by the claimed
distortion. The Uniform Act, itself, requires this of any
deviation. At the absolute outside limit, this would result
in excluding the sales factor.
3.

The Comparison with Depletion Figures.

The Court has also relied, in reaching its conclusion,
upon the comparison between the depletion figures and
allocated income. We recognize that this is a comparison
which, at least superficially, would suggest that Kennecott is trying to "have its cake and also eat it". Indeed,
going back to the very first Kennecott decision, it was a
problem which concerned Justice Latimer when he wrote:
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"All we need do in this case is to point out tl1'..lt
there are two possible paths for the taxpayer to
take. The Tax Commission might agree that it
take either but it cannot traverse both."''
We maintain our sincere contention that the comparison is irrelevant for reasons which will be summarized
below. But let us assume, arguendo, that the majority is
correct in its reasoning. Conceding that there is disparity
between the figures the first question is: What does that
disp;:irity prove? Even if one assumes that there should
be at least a rough relationship between the figures, and
that relationship does not in fact exist, it would only sugge;t that one figure of the two is suspect. It certainly
would not tend to prove that both figures were wrong.
However, please observe that the majority has stricken
both figures in its decision. On page 3 of the decision, the
majority says the allocation is wrong, relying on the depletion figures, and yet on the very next page, in the
same judicial breath, the majority continues by saying
that the depletion figures (used by the Court itself on
page 3) are erroneous. Thus, the Court relies upon a
premise, and having done so, demolishes the premise.
We are left with a situation where Kennecott's "cake"
can neither be had nor eaten, and where, to paraphrase
Latimer, Kennecott can traverse neither road.

If our depletion computation is wrong, as the Court
has now held, how can that very computation be used
against us to refute the statutory formula?
''Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission. 118
lltah 140 at 158. 221 P 2d 857 (1950).
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Going beyond this obvious inconsistency, it remains
true that the comparison is irrelevant. Separate accounting (depletion) simply is not relevant in impeaching the
formula as applied to a unitary business. To illustrate,
let us suppose that there was a unitary business which
had an equal amount of property, payroll and sales in
each of four states, A, B, C, and D. Further, suppose
that, on a separate accounting basis, that company had
net income from each state as shown in the illustration.

$20

$10
$5
$1
STATE A

STATE B

STATED

Payroll, Property and Sales

State D and State A would, of course, want to use sepa·
rate accounting since that would produce greater revenue.

'2'/

State B and State C would want to use the formula since
they would do better that way than under separate accounting. The taxpayer, of course, would like to use the
formula in A and D and separate accounting in B and C.
The squabbles could go on endlessly unless the law provided some presumption to solve the problem. The law
does precisely that by providing a strong presumption in
favor of the formula when dealing with a unitary business. A separate accounting figure, such as depletion, is
simply irrelevant, therefore, in rebutting the accuracy of
the formula. Again, this sage principle was adopted by
this Court in Western Contracting but abandoned here.
The one point which the Court completely ignores
in relying upon the depletion comparison is that this very
same type of disparity has existed in every case involving
the classic battle between the formula and separate accounting. The following cases illustrate the disparity very
dramatically.

Case
Superior Oil'"
Honolulu Oi120
Butler Bros.21
Western
Contracting22

Income Allocated Income Allocated
to the State by
to the State by
3-factor formula Separate Acctg.
$1.1 million
$10.6 million
$8.8 million
$18.5 million
Profit of $95,000 Loss of $82,000
$40,000

$1.7 million

Disparity
1,0003
2003
Infinite
4,2003

rnsuperior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545,
386 P. 2d 33 (1963).
zoHonolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552,
,
386 P. 2d 40 (1963).
21Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334, affd.
315 U. S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).
zzwestern Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
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Each of these cases involved a unitary business and
in each case the formula was applied notwithstanding the
cries of the taxpayer or the taxing agency that separate
accounting would produce a grossly disparate result. Likewise, the formula should apply here notwithstanding the
comparison with the separate accounting figures.
Again, we have to heed Western Contracting: The
disparity was far greater there than here and yet the
Court properly required the use of the formula - even
though the big question (unitary business) was contested
by the Commission. Here, we are held to be unitary and,
a fortiori, the formula should apply. The only real difference between Western Contracting and Kennecott is one
of size.
CONCLUSION -

ALLOCATION

Although the Uniform Act has now been adopted in
some 24 states, there has been virtually no litigation involving the use of the relief provision. In addition to the
decision of the Court in the present case, we have found
but one other reported decision on the subject - that
being Dona/,d M. Drake Company v. Department of Revenue, State of Oregon, 23 which was issued on October 26,
1971, after the instant case was submitted and argued.
We believe that the decision of the Oregon Tax Court,
being new matter, is worthy of careful review by the
Court for its similarity to the instant case is striking and
23CCH Oregon Tax Reports, Para. 202-522 (Ore. Tax Ct. October 26, 1971).
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the result reached is completely at odds with that announced by the majority herein. (We are including the
entire case as an appendix to this brief in view of the
fact that it may not be readily accessible to the Court.)
In the Oregon case, the taxpayer was a construction
company which performed work in Oregon, Washington
and California. For many years, including 1965 through
1967, the taxpayer had filed its returns on a segregated
or separate accounting basis in Oregon. In 1967, the California taxing agency required that this taxpayer file its
returns on a unitary basis utilizing a three-factor formula.
The State of California made a similar requirement of
Kennecott which is reflected in the Chase Brass decision.2' Thereupon, the taxpayer went to the State of
Oregon and amended its returns from 1965 through 1967
claiming that it should be entitled to use the unitary
method and the three-factor formula, and further claiming
refunds totaling several thousands of dollars. The Oregon
Department of Revenue denied the claimed refunds. Significantly, Oregon had adopted the Uniform Act effective
in the year 1965. On appeal from the Department of Revenue, the Tax Court noted that the Uniform Act provided
a "strong emphasis on the use of an apportionment formula" modified only by the relief provision of the Uniform
Act. The Department of Revenue, however, argued that
the relief provision in the Uniform Act gave it wide latitude and discretion in deviating where separate account24Chase Brass and Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 7 Cal.
App. 3d 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 27 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1970).
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ing would produce substantially more revenues. The following reasoning of the Tax Court in sustaining the taxpayer, should be compared with the reasoning of the
majority in this case:
"The uniform act recognizes that a corporation engaged in multistate activities, unitary in nature,
cannot neatly allocate its income from state to
state in a completely defensible way. Variations
in the facts among numerous businesses will present the taxpayers and the tax administrator with
material for endless controversy. Variants in formulas, especially in the sales factor, may whipsaw
the taxpayer. The uniform act clearly is designed
to replace a variety of apportionment formulas
(see Beaman, supra, ch. 3) with the formula approved by the majority of the states because it
recognizes the major factors (property, payroll,
sales) which lead to taxable income through business activity. The uniform act gives priority to the
use of a statutory formula as against segregated
accounting. It does not preclude the possibility of
the use of segregated accounting (with apportionment of overhead) but, in the opinion of the court,
in the interest of uniformity, such use is to be
exceptional. While the pre-1965 law did not endorse either method, the new act does. Otherwise,
the goal of uniformity would be quickly obscured."25 (Emphasis added.)
Here, the Tax Commission has found that Kennecott
and its subsidiaries constitute a unitary business - a
proposition which this Court has not challenged. In view
of that, and under the persuasive reasoning of the Oregon
2sCCH Oregon Tax Reports, Para. 202-522 (Oregon Tax Ct. Oc·
tober 26, 1971).
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decision, it seems quite clear that the application of the
three-factor formula is virtually mandatory unless the
State can come forward with some extremely compelling
reasons to the contrary. No such reasons have been
proven and, therefore, the formula should be applied.
Some mention must be made of the problems which
will be created by the instant majority decision. Please
recall that the Uniform Act was adopted in Utah with
the express purpose supported by both the language of
the statute itself and by the legislative history, of achieving uniformity. As noted by the Oregon court, and as is
obvious, once the Tax Commission is allowed to depart
from the formula "the goal of uniformity would be quickly
obscured". If the majority decision in the instant case
is to be followed, it will result in a complete lack of uniformity and in contests and litigation which will virtually
flood the court. For example, we see no logical reason
why the Tax Commission could not challenge virtually
every franchise tax return filed on the same basis that
they challenged the Kennecott returns. In virtually every
case, it will be seen that separate accounting will produce
a different income figure than the formula would produce.
Thus, where separate accounting will produce more
money, the Tax Commission will be free to challenge each
and every return that is filed on that basis, and if the
majority opinion is to be followed, that challenge will be
sustained. By the same token, and if the case is to be
applied consistently, any taxpayer would be free to challenge the use of the formula when it appears it would be
to his advantage to use separate accounting as opposed
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to the formula. So far as the sales factor is concerned
we presume that the Tax Commission will now be free'
to deviate from the formula with respect to any company
in the State of Utah which has production facilities here
but sells its products elsewhere. Likewise, it is presumed
that any company such as Westinghouse or General Motors which has its production facilities elsewhere and sales
only in the State of Utah, will be free to challenge taxation on the ground that since their only activity in Utah
is sales, and since the Utah Supreme Court has now held
that sales are an insignificant matter, they should not be
taxed at all in the State of Utah. Thus, the majority decision not only emasculates the concept of uniformity, but
indeed, will serve as a breeding ground for contests and
litigation for years to come.

It is worth noting, in passing, that in 1967 this Court
rendered a decision, Western Contracting, which was
looked upon as a classic in the field of allocation law. That
decision strongly supported the formula as applied to a
unitary business. If anything, the underlying philosophy
of Western Contracting was strengthened by the Uniform
Act with its emphasis on the use of the three-factor formula and uniformity. The Court, in the instant decision,
has taken a great leap backward by undermining Western
Contracting, as well as the Uniform Act.

To our knowledge, the majority decision constitutes
the first time in history that the three-factor formula has
been abandoned in favor of separate accounting where
a unitary business was concerned.
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POINT III.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN THE MATTERS OF REASONABLENESS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Again, assuming arguendo, that the Tax Commission
here could deviate from the Uniform formula, the majority's inquiry should not have stopped there. Utah Code
Annotated, Section 59-13-95 (Supp. 1971) provides:
"If the allocation and apportionment provisions of
this act do not fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for or the state tax commission
may require, in respect to all or any part of the
taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable:

(a)

Separate accounting;

(b)

The exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
The inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this state; or

(c)

The employment of any other method to
effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income." (Emphasis added.)
It is quite clear that any alternative method of allocation
adopted by the Tax Commission must be "reasonable",
"equitable", and of course, constitutional. In short, this
means not in the extreme. The majority opinion in adopting what is essentially a black and white approach to this
( d)
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case, ha3 not given heed to the reasonableness and equitable issues and has glossed over the constitutional issue.
In so doing, it has permitted a palpable and unprecedented injustice which in good conscience, should not be
allowed to stand. Simply stated, the majority opinion
approved an assessment without guidelines, without discussion, and without limits as to any amount or proportion, which, if followed, would create in the Tax Commission unbridled powers which transcend any concept
of constitutional government. The Tax Commission is
now free to throw out the Uniform Act and rewrite the
tax laws in any way it pleases. Surely that delegation of
power to the Tax Commission is unlawful in the extreme.
1. The amount allocated to Utah is unreasonable
and inequitable as compared to the total amount of income involved.
We start with the proposition that Utah is no doubt
entitled to its fair allocation of the overall apportionable
income of the taxpayer - i.e., its piece of the "income
pie". And, the best way to determine constitutionality
and reasonableness is to compare Utah's "slice" with the
total "pie."
The pie, for this purpose, is the consolidated net income of all of the plaintiffs. This includes not only Kennecott, the parent (which has four large copper properties and a large office in New York), but also Chase Brass
(the fabricating arm of Kennecott) , Peabody (a major
coal company involved in 1968 only), Bear Creek (the
exploration arm of the group), and other less significant
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entities. These affiliated corporations have virtually nationwide operations and, of course, have property, payroll
and sales in virtually every state in the country.
We are concerned here only with the "business" income of these entities for that is the only income which
by law is apportionable through the three-factor formula
(non-business or passive income is entirely allocated according to other rules - primarily situs of income production or corporate domicile).''; There were, below, only
two disputes between the parties regarding the total business or apportionable income: The matters of the federal
income tax deduction and the depletion deduction. The
majority of this Court has ruled against taxpayer on those
issues and, for purposes of the following presentation
only, the figures affirmed by the majority opinion for
these deductions are used in our computations. Thus,
we will be dealing with figures which completely favor
the Tax Commission. With these adjustments, the total
pie for the two years in question is as follows:
1967 .......................................................... $23,843,506' 1
1968 .......................................................... $40,890,869

These figures, to repeat, are the total amount of adjusted
apportionable income for the entire consolidated group
'';Utah Code Annotated. § 59-13-81 through § 59-13-85 (Supp.
1971).

''These figures were computed by starting with apportionable
income per the tax returns, adding an adjustment for depletion (the
amount claimed less the amount allowed by the court) and an adjustment for federal income tax (the amount claimed less the amount
allowed by the court).
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for the years in question. These figures are, to return tu
our analogy, the "total pie" of which Utah may tax a
reasonable "slice".
The Tax Commission, as affirmed by the majority
opinion of this Court, holds that its "portion" of the pie
is $18,585,435 for 1967 (which is 78% of the total pie),
and $28,141,464 for 1968 (which is 69% of the total pie).
To illustrate the unconscionability of the holding, we set
forth the figures graphically:
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF
TAXPAYER'S TOTAL CONSOLIDATED
NET INCOME TAXED BY UTAH
Amount Which Utah
Allocates to
Other Stah's

783

1967

69%

1968

The amounts being claimed by Utah cannot be taxed
by this State merely because the Tax Commission so
rules - there must be some credible evidence that there
is, in fact, business activity in Utah comparable to the
percentage claimed. Utah simply does not have the power
or jurisdiction to tax beyond the amount which is fairly
represented by business acti\'ities in Utah. The record.

37

itself is clear, beyond any reasonable question, that there
is simply not enough of the taxpayer's business activity
in Utah to justify taxation even approaching the levels
involved here. Viewed by any possible method of comparison, the 78% claimed by Utah for 1967 and the 69%
claimed for 1968 are so excessive as to shock the conscience of any reasonable person. We cite the following
comparisons to demonstrate why we complain so keenly:
(1) In 1967, how can the Tax Commission possibly
tax 78% of this taxpayer's income when the Commission
itself found that for 1967 only 41 % of the taxpayer's business activity was in Utah? (Tr. 681.)

(2) In 1967, how could 78% of this taxpayer's business activity be in Utah when only 42.5% of its property
was here, only 42.9% of its payroll was here, and, even
if all of Utah Copper Division sales were allocated to
Utah, that would only amount to 39.77% of the taxpayer's total sales allocated to Utah? (Tr. 680, 681.)
(3) In 1967, how can this taxpayer possibly be
taxed to the extent of 78% of its income, when the Uniform Act Formula (presumptively valid) allocates but
28% of the taxpayer's income to Utah? (Tr. 435.)
( 4) In 1968, how can the Tax Commission possibly
tax 69% of this taxpayer's income when the Commission
itself found that for 1968 only 33.3% of the taxpayer's
business activity was in Utah? (Tr. 681.)
(5) In 1968, how could 69% of this taxpayer's business activity be in Utah when only 35.7% of its property
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was here, only 3:3.4% of its payroll was here, and, even
if dl sales of the Utah Copper Division were allocated to
Utah, that would only amount to 30.94% of taxpayer's
total sales allocated to Utah? (Tr. 680, 681.)
(6) In 1968, how can the taxpayer possibly be taxed
to the extent of 69% of its income, when the Uniform
Act formula (presumptively valid) allocates but 23% of
taxpayer's income to Utah? (Tr. 495.)
The answer to these questions is, simply and plainly,
that there is not one scintilla of evidence in the record to
support taxation at the levels of 78% for 1967 or 69% for
1968. It can only be concluded that the deficiency assess·
ment is stretched beyond the breaking point. It is pat·
ently unreasonable and inequitable. Even if some devia·
tion from the Uniform formula could be justified, it is
clear that the Tax Commission has gone much too far in
its method.
Certainly this Court not only has the power but, indeed, the bounden duty to prevent the type of confiscatory taxation evidenced by these figures. The Tax Commission cannot be allowed to simply substitute any
amount which it believes desirable to strengthen the
State's budget. It must be limited by reasonable guidelines. Such guidelines are not detailed in the statute and
are completely absent from the majority opinion. As ap·
plied by the Tax Commission and now approved by the
majority opinion, Utah's Uniform Act relief provision's
o-Utah Code Annotated, § 59-13-95 (Supp. 1971).
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ic; a patently unconstitutional delegation of legislative
powers. The majority opinion has, in clear effect, ruled
that the Tax Commission, under the guise of the latter's
discretion, can, with complete impunity, quadruple this
taxpayer's tax and multiply it two or three times as much
as any conceivable indicia of business activity would justify. In short, the Commission can rewrite the statute to
its own liking.
It is true that this case has raised numerous complicated issues, but, returning to our original thesis, complexity cannot provide an excuse to simply sweep the
entire case under the rug of "administrative expertise
and discretion." No administrative body should be accorded the powers ceded to the Tax Commission by the
majority's opinion. In case after case, this Court has
previously denounced delegations of power to administrative bodies which powers were as naught compared with
those granted here.2" In Tite v. State Tax Commission, 30
this Court struck down the authority delegated to the
Tax Commission to determine a fine from $1.00 to $299.00,
but in the instant case, the Tax Commission is now told
it may, with absolute impunity, quadruple a tax to the
tune of millions beyond what the Uniform Act would
allow. True, Tite involved a penalty which evoked certain
traditional delegation problems, but is it not a triumph
29See Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Company,
18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P. 2d 504 (1966) and cases cited therein; particularly see Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 P. 2d 563
(1948) and Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P.
2d 1 (1940).
30 89 Utah 404, 57 P. 2d 734 (1936).
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of form over substance to say in Tite that the Tax Com.
mission does not have power to make a taxpayer pay
within the limits of $1.00 to $299.00, and yet here announce that its discretion is granted in multiples of millions? It has been held elsewhere that even giving a Tax
Commission the discretion to impose interest at 6% is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. United
States Steel Corp. v. Washington. 31
The Uniform Act circumscribes the Tax Commission's power by requiring "reason" and "equity", and yet
even those broad standards have been erased here in
favor of unprecedented administrative powers.
(2)

The assessment is unconstitutional.

For much the same reasons as hereinabove discussed,
the assessment, as approved by the majority opinion is
clearly unconstitutional. The majority opinion does at
least pay lip service to the problem by stating:
"The Utah act we are here dealing with does not
seek to impose a tax upon income or business done
outside the State of Utah. The act only seeks to
impose a tax upon that portion of Kennecott's in·
come which is derived from its business activity in
in this State. We are of the opinion that the stat·
ute and the decision of the Commission do not in·
fringe constitutional rights of Kennecott."
For the purposes of this case and contrary to the thrust
of this opinion, we have not needed to assert that the
Uniform Act is unconstitutional and do not do so now.
3165 Wash. 2d 361, 397 P. 2d 440 (1964).
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To the contrary, we have relied largely on the unreasonable application of the Act's relief provisions by the Tax
Commission.
Everyone should presumably concede that Utah's
power and jurisdiction to tax an interstate business is
limited to the extent of the business activity of that taxpayer in Utah. This has been stated time and time again
by the United States Supreme Court and has been clearly
articulated by this Court as well. We submit, however,
that the assessment so greatly exceeds the permissible
sphere of taxation as delineated by the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses as to be patently unconstitutional.
There is simply no evidence, real or supposititious, that
78% (1967) or 69% (1968) of this taxpayer's business
activity is in Utah, no matter what common sense yardstick is used. Indeed, it is wholly an illusory image for
the Tax Commission to make any such assumption. In
this connection, it should be remembered that the plaintiffs are a national group of affiliated corporations which
have property, payroll, sales and other types of business
activities throughout the country. While the Utah mine
is an important part in this operation of nationwide scope,
by no stretch of the imagination does it amount to 69%
to 78 % of the entire vast operations of the group.
Utah is not an isolated and separate sovereign nation. It is only one of the States within our federal system
subject to federal constitutional limitations, and its taxing power must be measured not solely on a Utah
but with full consideration of the impact elsewhere. Tax-
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payer's business activity, in Utah, in order to be measured
in its proper perspective, must be compared with its business activity elsewhere. If property, payroll and sales are
used as the ingredients of business activity (which is true
in the 24 states which now have the Uniform Act as well
as in virtually all of the 45 states which have this kind
of tax), it may be seen that Utah's share of business activity was 28% in 1967 and 23% in 1968. No matter how
the Tax Commission may try by juggling the sales or
other factors, these figures cannot be increased within
reason beyond about 42% for 1967 and about 30% for
1968. And yet plaintiffs are being taxed at 78% for 1967
and 69% for 1968! The net result is that Utah, by claiming two or three times its maximum allowable share of the
plaintiffs' entire income through a method of allocation
which is inconsistent with that used any place else, obtains a windfall and the taxpayer is exposed to multiple
taxation.
The question was asked during oral argument, if it
is Utah rather than the other states which is out of line
in this respect. The decision below presupposes that Utah
is correct in its allocation and all of the other states,
which have some claim to the income involved, are wrong.
This is like saying that the state which sequesters most
of the taxes is right and those that get the leavings are
wrong. It is Utah, not the other states, which is claiming
400% of what the "uniform" formula would allow. It is
Utah, not the other states, that has deviated from the
formula to extract more tax revenues. It is Utah, in other
words, that is being inconsistent and non-uniform.
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This is the precise thrust of the Supreme Court's
General Motors 32 decision prohibiting such action, which
states:
"In any case, the sheer inconsistency of the District formula with that generally prevailing [the
three-factor formula] may tend to result in the
unhealthy fragmentation of enterprise and an uneconomic pattern of plant location.... " 33
as:

Likewise, the Court referred to the District's formula
" ... an apportionment formula seriously at variance with those prevailing in the vast majority of
states and creats substantial dangers of multiple
taxation. " 34

Thus, to determine who is out of step, it is only necessary
to point out that it is Utah which has adopted the inconsistent method of allocation which quadruples the income
that would otherwise be allocated under the method utilized by virtually every other state.
The taxpayer's contentions of unconstitutionality are
clearly supported by prior decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. In addition to the General Motors case,
there is a landmark decision in Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v.
North Carolina, 35 which is strikingly similar on the facts.
There, as here, production facilities were in the taxing
32General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.
S. Ct. 1156, 14 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1965).
33 380 U. S. at 560.
3•380 U. S. at 556.
35283 U. S. 123, 75 L. Ed. 879 (1931).

553, 85
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state with sales primarily elsewhere. The State was claiming an allocation of over 80% of the taxpayer's income
but the evidence showed business activity of only up t-0
21 % - a disparity comparable in magnitude to that existing here. The Supreme Court concluded:
" ... the statutory method, as applied to the appellant's business for the years in question, operated unreasonably and arbitrarily, in attributing
to North Carolina a percentage of income out of
all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that state." 30
A more current case to the same effect is Norfolk & West·
em Railroad Co. v. Missouri Tax Commission. 37 Indicia
of business activity equalled a percentage as high as
3.16%, but the state allocated 8.2%. The Supreme Court
struck down the tax by noting that:
" ... our cases certainly forbid an unexplained discrepancy as gross as that in this case." 38
What was condemned in these cases is precisely what
was upheld by the majority opinion here - the reaching
of a state for income far beyond any reasonable indicia
of business activity therein.
The majority opinion has not referred to any of these
cases except General Motors v. District of Columbia,
which certainly cannot be cited as precedent for its deci·
sion. The decision in General Motors condemns the very
type of inconsistency which the majority here allows to
36283 U. S. at 135.
31390 U. S. 317, 88 S. Ct. 995, 19 L. Ed 2d 1201 (1968).
38390 U. S. at 327.
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stand. Other cases cited by the majority opinion are likewise inapposite. The Illinois Central Railroad Co. case••
cited by the majority in upholding the tax, stated:
"Appellant is not singled out for special treatment.
It is not taxed on one formula; the others, on another. They are all taxed pursuant to the same
formula .... " 40
Certainly, no case which has that language can be authority for what is done here since this taxpayer has indeed
be8n singled out for special treatment applicable to no one
else, which is eminently unfair and unjust by any standard. The final case, General Motors v. State of Washington,'' is clearly inapposite on its facts since it involves a
gross receipts, non-apportioned tax.
We conclude this portion of the brief by submitting
that the assessment, affirmed by the majority, is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(a) It involves an application and construction of
the "relief provision" of the Uniform Act which gives to
the Tax Commission such uncontrolled discretion as to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the
separation of powers concept of the Utah Constitution.
(b) It taxes the taxpayer beyond any reasonable
measure of its business activity in Utah and hence vio••Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157, 84 L.

Ed. 670 ( 1940) .

•0309 U. S. at 163.
0377 U. S. 436, 84 S. Ct. 1564, 12 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1964).
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!ates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(c) It creates a wholly inconsistent method of allocation which has the effect of penalizing this particular
interstate taxpayer alone beyond any conceivable fair
measure of its activities in the state and creates substantial dangers of multiple taxation, and hence, violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
(d) It singles this taxpayer out for special and unequal treatment as to the matters of consolidated return
and allocation, and hence violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE MATTER OF
INTEREST.
We also object, finally, to the assessment of interest.
Unfortunately, the taxpayer finds itself in this plight:
The Utah Legislature enacts, effective January 1, 1967,
a Uniform Act which requires the use of a three-factor
formula for allocation. In admitted compliance with that
statute, the taxpayer duly files its returns both for 1967
and 1968. Not until June of 1970 did the Tax Commission
serve a deficiency assessment. Certainly, at the time of
the computation and payment of these taxes per the re·
tum, the taxpayer acted in good faith.
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After the assessment in 1970, the Tax Commission
promptly announced that the Supreme Court would have
to decide the case. •2 The deficiency assessment consisted
of a new method of allocation unlike anything ever seen
before in Utah or elsewhere, i.e., a special deviation which
was designed for Kennecott and Kennecott alone.
The decision of the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed this hybrid. And to make matters worse, the taxpayer, whose only fault was in following the requirements
of the new law, is told that not only must it pay four
times the amount of tax the law requires, but it must
also pay a penalty of interest from the date the taxes
were originally due. We are not just talking about an
insignificant sum. The interest computed to May 15, 1972,
will be $469,800. Under the facts of this case, we ask on
what fair and just basis has the Tax Commission the discretion to penalize this taxpayer to that extent?
There has been no inference of fraud, negligence, or
shady dealing by the taxpayer. The majority itself recites
the stipulated fact that the returns were filed in accordance with the Uniform Act. Certainly, a taxpayer should
not be penalized for merely doing what the law says it
must do. How would Kennecott know that the Tax Commission would refuse to follow the Uniform Act? It certainly cannot be said that the taxpayer's position was unreasonable - indeed, any taxpayer would have _done the
same thing - it would have filed under the clear dictates
•2See Affidavit attached to Petitioners' Motion for Disqualification of Commissioners, Tr. 23-25.
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of the Act as further supported by this Court's own decision in Western Contracting.4' It cannot be claimed
that this is simply an open-and-shut case. Obviously any
such contention as that is well rebutted by the fact that
the Chief Justice and Judge Erickson both agreed that
the taxpayer was correct in its approach.
The assessment of interest is discretionary with the
Tax Commission but that certainly does not preclude
judicial review of the assessment. That discretion is not
a carte bwnche. Many years ago, Lord Coke defined ju.
dicial discretion as "to see what is just according to the
laws in the premises."
Finally, if the Commission's discretion is to be con·
strued that broadly by the Court, the result is clearly an
unconstitutional delegation of authority. The same question was before the Supreme Court of Washington in
United States Steel Corp. v. Washington, .. where the
Tax Commission likewise had statutory discretion to impose interest up to 6% on a deficiency. That Court held:
"The trial court concluded that RCW 82.32.050
(quoted supra) is unconstitutional because it vio·
lates Art. 2, Sec. 1 (Amendment 7) of our state
constitution which vests legislative power in the
state legislature, reserving the powers of initiative
and referendum to the people. We agree.
43Western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
4465 Wash. 2d 361, 397 P. 2d 440 (1964).
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"In short, giving to the Tax Commission the power
to determine, in its sole and unrestricted discretion, the amount, if any, of interest not exceeding

6 per cent per anmun, on delinquent taxes is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority
in the absenec of a declared legislative purpose and
of accompanying rules of action, standards and
guidelines whereby the exercise of discretion may
be measured. State v. Gilroy, 37 Wash. 2d 41, 221
P. 2d 549 (1950), and cases cited.
"The judgment is affirmed."• 5

To counsel for plaintiffs it seems that the majority
decision overturns good law and order for it hardly seems
just and fair for the Commission to change signals in the
midst of its "game" and then exact the last pound of
money because one player did not anticipate the change.
If doing that is exercising legal discretion, then all counsel can assert is that our concept of what constitutes legal
discretion is distorted.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit that
the Tax Commission has abused its discretion in assessing interest, and if not, then its discretionary power to
assess interest is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
CONCLUSION
So far as counsel has been able to determine, this is
the first case involving the interpretation of the Uniform
<5397 P. 2d at 442.
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Act's relief provision to be decided by any state's highest
court. Considering the fact that 24 states now have the
Act, and that an important principle involving uniformity
is at stake, it is clear that this case ought to be a beacon
light for other states to follow. While the plaintiffs here
concerned are hurt by the effect of the Court's erroneous
decision, the over-reaching principles announced eat away
at the benefits to be derived by all multistate taxpayers
from a uniform application of the tax law.
In reading the majority opinion objectively, we find
a paucity of facts mentioned and less than a full page of
discussion and analysis. If there is any real substance to
the principle that litigants are entitled to be advised of
the legal concepts which support a decision taking away
their wealth then plaintiffs have been short-changed.
By way of illustration, take the issue of whether or
not the deficiency assessment is "reasonable" or "equitable". Between the plaintiff and the Commission, some
45 pages of briefs were submitted on this issue, citing
facts, opinions and cases. Extensive oral argument was
devoted to the question. Significantly, the majority opin·
ion has failed to discuss or analyze the issue, hence it is
resolved against plaintiffs, sub silentio. The same is true
of the consolidated return issue.
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At a bare minimum, in view of the magnitude of the
case, it deserves more attention.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for rehearing should be granted and the decision withdrawn
and further arguments be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN A. BEHLE
GEORGE W. LATIMER
JOHN A. DAHLSTROM
GORDON L. ROBERTS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
March 3, 1972
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APPENDIX
This appendix consists of the full-text opiruon of
Judge Roberts of the Oregon Tax Court in the case of
Donald M. Drake Company v. Department of Revenue,
State of Oregon, No. 551 (Decided October 26, 1971).
This case is reported at CCH, Oregon Tax Reports, Para.
202-522.
[Decision]

J.-Plaintiff sought corporation excise tax
refunds from the Department of Revenue for the tax
years 1965, 1966 and 1967 but, after a hearing, the petitions were denied by the department's Order No. I-70-32
and it imposed small additional assessments. Appeal to
this court was taken pursuant to ORS 314.460.
ROBERTS,

The plaintiff, Donald M. Drake Company, is an Oregon corporation with its principal office located in Portland, Oregon. Its business is that of a general contractor,
engaged in every type of major construction. During the
years in question, it worked on projects in Washington,
Oregon and California. For the three years in controversy,
1965, 1966 and 1967, and for many years prior thereto, the
taxpayer filed its Oregon corporation excise tax returns
on a segregated basis, treating each job in each state as
a separate item on its books, allocating to each its direct
expenses and then charging to the jobs in each state a
percentage of the overhead expenses in the proportion
that the job cost totals in one state related to the total
of all job costs. (Taxes were charged to the jurisdiction
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m which levied.) Using this method, Oregon
gave rise to net income but projects in California showed
substantial losses. (In passing, it is noted that the uncon.
tradicted testimony indicated that the dollar amount o!
corporation excise tax paid to Oregon was three to four
times the dollar amount of federal income taxes paid in
each of the three years, raising a question as to the pro.
priety of the division of income method used.)
In 1967, the State Board of Equalization of California
demanded that the taxpayer's 1967 return in that state be
filed on a unitary basis. This stimulated the plaintiff into
a lengthy reexamination of its reporting methods. It re·
worked its returns for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967, usini
the unitary method, and thereupon claimed refunds from
the State of Oregon for 1965 in the sum of $11,785.16:
for 1966 in the sums of $6,710.59; and for the year 1967 in
the sum of $26,334; plus interest for each year as provided
by law. The claims for refund were denied by the Depart·
ment of Revenue citing Utah Const. & Mining v. Tax
Com., 255 Ore. 228, 465 P. 2d 712 (1970). In appealini
to this court, plaintiff pleaded that, for each year, the
segregated accounting method, with direct allocation ol
overhead, resulted in an amount of income being taxed
by the State of Oregon which was disproportionate to the
profit realized by plaintiff in Oregon.
ORS chapter 317 imposes an excise tax upon businesi
corporations for the privilege of carrying on or doing busi
ness in the State of Oregon which, under the statute, can·
not be imposed upon income received by the taxpayer
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from sources outside this state. The questions raised by
the present case are familiar to corporations engaged in
business both inside and outside Oregon where income,
although often inextricably mixed, must be divided among
the several states. (The question of when the division
of income is required and the methods of making the division are nicely delineated in Beaman, Paying Taxes to
Other States, 7-7 (1963) ).
Oregon recognize3 that the conduct of some businesses can be segregated and properly reported on a separate accounting basis but that, generally, where an organization is engaged in business activities in more than one
state, overhead costs of the central office must be apportioned by some formula to the activities in each state.
(See Beaman, supra, 7-20, for a helpful commentary.)
The Department of Revenue's Reg. 314.615-(B), in explication of ORS 314.615, defines "unitary business" and
shows its impact upon the method of reporting. It states,
in part:

"If the business activity of the taxpayer is
carried on both within and without this state, and
the income properly attributable to Oregon may
be fairly reflected only by treating the business
activity within and without the state as unitary,
the apportionment method must be used. * * *"
(Emphasis supplied.)
For a number of years prior to January 1, 1965, the
Oregon statute relating to the allocation of income and
losses of a corporation or a nonresident individual from
business within and without the state was ORS 314.280.
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It will be noted that that statute vested substantial dis.
cretion in the State Tax Commission, now the Department of Revenue. ("* * * No one system of report.
ing is endorsed over another as long as the method used
will accomplish the purpose mentioned." Utah Const. &
Mining v. Commission, 3 OTR 385, 391 (1969) .) But
even under that act, the State Tax Commission's Reg.
314-280(1)-(A) readinpart:
•h
* * In most cases the circumstances
are such that the income arising from the business
done in Oregon must be determined by the appor·
tionment method (Reg. 314.280 (1)-(B)). The
segregated accounting method (Reg. 314.280(1)·
(C)) is appropriate where the business or activity
in and out of the state cannot be classed as uni·
tary. In some cases where activities, some unitary,
some segregable, the facts may require the use of
a method combining features of both segregation
and apportionment." (Emphasis supplied.)

The division of income of business organizations was
placed under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, ORS 314.605 to 314.670, beginning January
1, 1965. The Tax Commission's concept of the pre-emi·
nence of the apportionment method, as opposed to the
segregable method, of accounting for multistate income
is also reflected in ORS 314.615 of the uniform act:
"Any taxpayer having income from busines.s
activity which is taxable both within and
this state, other than activity as a financial orgaru·
zation or public utility or the rendering of purely
personal services by an indivdual, shall allocate
and apportion his net income as provided in ORS

v
314.605 to 314.675.

plied.)

* * *"

(Emphasis sup-

Thus, by this section of the uniform act, "the apportionment formula is prescribed for taxpayers which are 'taxable both within and without this state .. .' " (Emphasis
supplied.) Beaman, supra, 7-5. ORS 314.620 of the act
specifies when a taxpayer is considered taxable in another
state.

This strong emphasis on the use of an apportionment
formula in the usual case is modified only by ORS 314.670.
"If the allocation and apportionment provisions of ORS 314.610 to 314.665 do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for
and the commission may permit, or the commission may require, in respect to all or any part of
the taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable:

"*

* * * *

"(4) The employment of any other method
to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income." (Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony presented to the court is conclusive
that the plaintiff's operation in Oregon, Washington and
California during the years 1965, 1966 and 1967 was a
unitary business as defined in the department's regulation
and in Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 62 S.
Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).

VI

The defendant agrees that the Uniform Division o!
Income for Tax Purposes Act governs the reporting
method to be used by the plaintiff during the tax years
in question. It then argues that ORS 314.670 (presum.
ably read in conjunction with ORS 314.615) gives the Department of Revenune the same latitude or area of discretion as was found under the prior law, referred to by
the Tax Court in the Utah Const. & Mining case, supra,
and, on appeal, by the Supreme Court (255 Ore. 228, 46n
P. 2d 712 (1970)). In a post-trial brief, defendant states:
"All the taxpayer argues is 'since we are unitary, by definition the only way to correctly show
a portion of business profits as a unitary
is the Oregon formula.' This is not a correct statement of the law in Oregon because of the Utah
Construction case."
Defendant ends its brief with three conclusions:
"l. UDITPA [Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes Act] does not require apportion·
ment of income for unitary corporations.

"2. Using the apportionment method of ac·
counting would distant [sic] the income attributa·
ble to Oregon.
"3. Taxpayer has failed to carry its
burden' of proving that segregated accountm,i
would not 'fairly represent the extent of taxpayer;
business activity in this state,' and in fact
shown no reason for changing the method wh1ct
it originally filed other than the use of an errone
ous legal conclusion that 'unitary equals appor·
tionment.' "
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Contrary to the prior law, which gave wide discretion
to the State Tax Commission "to permit or require either
ihe segregated method of reporting or the apportionment
method of reporting" (as stated in the pre-1965 version
of ORS 314.280), the uniform act sets out and requires
the use of the apportionment method with a particularized three-factor formula, making an exception (in ORS
814.670) only when one party or the other can prove that
"the allocation and apportionment provisions of ORS
814.610 to 314.665 do not fairly represent the evtent of
the taxpayer's business activity in this state." No cases
in point have been found construing this part of the relatively new uniform act, but the court must take notice
of the statutory arrangement, the prominent position
therein of ORS 314.615 and the sections directly appurtenant to it which categorize and define the terms used therein, these being followed by ORS 314.670 almost as an appendage. This is in notable contrast to the pre-1965 ORS
814.280 and is deemed significant for purposes of statutory construction. This conclusion is fortified by the experience of tax administrators, as evidenced by Beaman,
supra, as indicated in the Oregon administrator's regulations, and noted in statements of the Tax Court in the
Utah Const. & Mining case, supra, relative to Oregon's
emphasis on the unitary method of reporting as being
most useful in the majority of cases.
The uniform act recognizes that a corporation engaged in multistate activities, unitary in nature, cannot
neatly allocate its income from state to state in a com-
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pletely defensible way. Variations in the facts among
numerous businesses will present the taxpayers and the
tax administrator with material for endless controversy.
Variants in formulas, especially in the sales factor, may
whipsaw the taxpayer. The uniform act clearly is designed
to replace a variety of apportionment formulas (see Beaman, supra, ch. 3) with the formula approved by the majority of the states because it recognizes the major factors
(property, payroll, sales) which lead to taxable income
through business activity. The uniform act gives
to the use of a statutory formula as against segregated
accounting. It does not preclude the possibility of the use
of segregated accounting (with apportionment of over·
head) but, in the opinion of the court, in the interest of
uniformity, such use is to be exceptional. While the pre1965 law did not endorse either method, the new act does.
Otherwise, the goal of uniformity would be quickly ob·
scured. Therefore, the subject taxpayer must use the
statutory formula in reporting income; if it believes it
cannot do so, the burden to show the applicability of ORS
314.670 is upon it. Conversely, if the taxpayer follows
ORS 314.615, and the department impeaches the method,
the burden falls on the department to sustain its position.
In its second conclusion, the defendant has stated
that "using the apportionment method of accounting woul
distant [sic l the income attributable to Oregon." This
taken to mean that the plaintiff, by utilizing ORS 314.615,
will reduce the taxes payable to Oregon and increase the
taxes payable to California for the years 1965 to 1967, in·
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elusive. However, the conclusion begs the question. The
question is, "What is the income attributable to Oregon?"
The uniform act indicates that the determination of this
question, except in the few special cases contemplated by
ORS 314.670, cannot be made unless the three-factor
formula as set out by the uniform act is utilized. The
question is not by what method the State of Oregon can
derive the greater amount of revenue. The state must
make a determination, based upon the taxpayer's specific
activities within the state's borders, and the relationship,
if any, of these activities to similar activities in another
state or states, as to whether the corporate activities are
unitary, segregable, or a mixture of both. As the 1969 act
is written, the state must assume that the activities of the
taxpayer are unitary and must require a report using the
three-factor formula. The burden then would fall upon
the taxpayer to prove that conformance would misrepresent its business activity in the state.
The court finds that the plaintiff made timely application to amend its returns. When challenged, it made
a prima facie case showing that, in the years in question,
it was a unitary business (a question of fact), that it came
within the general requirements of ORS 314.615 and that
there was reason to conclude that segregated accounting
("direct allocation") would result in a disproportionate
part of its income being taxed by Oregon. The defendant
made no effort in court to rebut this evidence and it is
presumed by the court to be the truth. ORS 44.370.
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The defendant relied wholly on the Utah Const. &
Mining decision but that case is easily distinguished. It
interpreted a different statute (as the lower court carefully noted in 3 OTR 385, 386) and that court found as
a fact that the taxpayer's activity in Oregon was segrega.
ble. ("Here, during the period involved, the plaintiff con.
ducted one separate construction project in this
which was not related to its other construction projects
elsewhere." 3 OTR 385, 393.)
Accordingly, the Department of Revenue's Order No.
I-70-32 is set aside and the refund claims of the plaintiff
for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967 are approved (the par·
ties having stipulated that if the plaintiff is found to be
conducting a unitary business for the years mentioned,
the calculations set out in the refund claims are correct,
only the interest payable being calculated anew). No
costs to either party.

